This paper studies the identification problem in infinite horizon Markovian games and proposes a generally applicable estimation method. Every period firms simultaneously select an action from a finite set. We characterize the set of Markov equilibria. Period profits are a linear function of equilibrium choice probabilities. The question of identification of these values is then reduced to the existence of a solution to this linear equation system. We characterize the identification conditions. We propose a simple estimation procedure which follows the steps in the identification argument. The estimator is consistent, asymptotic normally distributed, and efficient.
Introduction
After the seminal papers by Bresnahan and Reiss (1987 , 1990 , 1991 , equilibrium conditions of static games with binary actions have become a basic estimation tool in empirical industrial organization.
The technique makes possible the inference of pro¯t values and entry costs based on the number of active¯rms in the industry. Static entry models have been analyzed in a number of recent papers including Berry (1992) , Davis (1999) , Mazzeo (2002) , Seim (2001) and Tamer (2003) . See Reiss (1996) and Berry and Reiss (2002) for surveys of the literature. A shortcoming of this literature is that dynamic considerations are left aside and a static view of the world is adopted. This paper studies the identi¯cation problem of in¯nite horizon Markovian games and proposes a generally applicable estimation method for dynamic games. Every period each¯rm privately observes a pro¯tability shock drawn from a known distribution function. Firms simultaneously choose an action from a¯nite set. In our application, the¯rms decide whether to enter, to remain active, or to exit the industry. The dynamic game permits decisions to be a function of observable state variables. Firms make forward looking decisions taking into account the e®ect of future entry and demand on future pro¯ts. The dynamic formulation has at least three advantages over the static model commonly used in the literature: (i) it allows distinct period payo®s as a function of state variables; (ii) contemporaneous demand and state variables determine whether entry takes place; and (iii) explicit information in the timing of actions is exploited. The increased richness of our model permits us to infer a larger set of parameters.
The main contribution of the paper is twofold: First, we show new identi¯cation results for dynamic games. We characterize conditions under which the period payo®s can be identi¯ed. The identi¯cation arguments are based on a su±ciently rich time-series data on observed choices.
Second, we propose a computationally simple estimation method generally applicable for dynamic games. The estimation method is similar to Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) but considers¯nite action games instead of continuous choice games. The choice probabilities are estimated using maximum likelihood. The period payo®s are inferred by using the equilibrium conditions of the dynamic game. The estimator is consistent, asymptotic normally distributed, and e±cient.
The main idea behind this paper stems from the following observation: In¯nite action games with private information, there exists a type that is exactly indi®erent between two alternative actions. For this type, the continuation value of one action must equal the continuation value of the alternative action. The indi®erent type condition is satis¯ed at every state vector yielding an equation system with as many equations as there are states. The equation system stemming from the indi®erence conditions permits us to adopt a similar estimation technique as to that in continuous choice dynamic games. The indi®erent type is not observed but can be inferred from the observed choices. Further, for each state variable, the indi®erence condition is a linear equation in period pro¯ts. This follows from the fact that the value function is linear in period payo®s. The linearity substantially simpli¯es the identi¯cation and estimation problem. Based on the linearity, we can express the parameters of the model as an explicit function of the choice probabilities. The identi¯cation question is then reduced to the existence of a unique solution to the linear equation system. In addition, the set of indi®erence conditions enables us to numerically calculate Markov equilibria of¯nite action games in a simple way.
We apply the proposed method to data consisting of quarterly time series observations regarding the identity of active¯rms in a number of industries for two Austrian cities between 1982 and 2002.
In addition, we use gross domestic product time series data. The estimation proceeds as follows:
First, a probit model is estimated. The dependent variable is an indicator variable whether thē rm is active in a period. The explanatory variables are the state variables including an indicator of whether the¯rm was active in the preceding period, the number of other active¯rms in the preceding period, the level of gross domestic product, and interaction terms between these variables.
We assume that gross domestic product evolves deterministically. We then construct the transition probability matrix of state variables using the probit estimates.
We infer the period pro¯t values based on the equilibrium condition for the indi®erent type. We illustrate the simplicity of the estimation approach, discuss the goodness of¯t of our estimates, and assess properties of the equilibrium. Finally, we conduct a policy experiment in which a unit tax is imposed on¯rms deciding to enter the industry.
There is a small empirical literature on dynamic games including Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000, 2003) , Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) , Pakes and Berry (2002) , and Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2003) . Our model formulation and estimation approach is most closely related to Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) . Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer consider an in¯nite horizon Markovian bidding game with idiosyncratic cost shocks under the presence of capacity constraints. Estimation proceeds in two stages: In the¯rst stage, the choice probabilities are estimated using the observed bid data and an expression for the value function is obtained based on the choice probability estimates similar to Hotz and Miller (1993) . In the second stage, the costs are inferred based on the¯rst order condition of optimally chosen bids. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) show that the¯rst order condition in continuous choice dynamic bidding games is a linear equation in unknown cost parameters.
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) consider a two-stage estimation approach for¯nite actions dynamic games. They show that, after substituting the¯rst stage choice probabilities and obtaining an expression for the value function, the optimality conditions of the discrete game can be written as inequalities. In the second stage, Aguirregabiria and Mira propose a pseudo maximum likelihood estimator in which the likelihood de¯ned by those inequalities is maximized. Simulation is used in the second stage to reduce the computational complexity of the estimator. Pakes and Berry (2002) propose two estimators for dynamic entry games: A nested¯xed point estimator similar to Rust (1994) , and a two stage estimator in which a pseudo likelihood is estimated in the second stage, similarly to Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) . In contrast to these approaches, the estimator proposed in this paper dispenses entirely with the second stage maximum likelihood estimation, or nested¯xed point estimation. Instead, an e±cient and computationally simple estimator is proposed based on the indi®erent type conditions which give a system of equations linear in the parameters.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the dynamic game with a¯nite action space. Section 3 characterizes properties of the equilibrium. Section 4 presents the identi¯cation results. Section 5 proposes the estimator. Section 6 describes the data and gives some descriptive statistics. Section 7 reports the estimation results. Section 8 ilustrates the long run payo®s and assesses a policy experiment in which a unit tax is imposed on¯rms deciding to enter. Section 9 concludes.
Model
This section describes the elements of the model. We describe the sequencing of events, the period game, the transition function, the payo®s, the strategies and the equilibrium concept.
We consider a dynamic game with discrete time, t = 1; 2 : : : ; 1. The set of¯rms is denoted by N = f1; : : : ; N g and a typical¯rm is denoted by i 2 N. The number of¯rms is¯xed and does not change over time. Every period the following events take place: Each¯rm i privately observes a K dimensional real valued pro¯tability shock
The shock is not observed by other¯rms. The shock " tk i is drawn independently from the strict monotone and continuous distribution function F . Independence of " t i from the state variables is an important assumption, since it allows us to adopt the Markov dynamic decision framework. For a discussion of the independence assumption in Markovian decision problems see Rust (1994) . We
¤ exists for all ", to ensure that the expected period return exists.
Actions: Each¯rm decides which action to take, a t i 2 A i = f0; 1; : : : ; Kg. All N¯rms, including ¯rms not active in the last period, make their decisions simultaneously. The actions are taken after rms observe the state and their idiosyncratic productivity shock. An action pro¯le a t denotes the vector of joint actions in period t, a t = (a The transition of the state variables is described by a probability density function g : A£S£S ¡! The period payo® of¯rm i is collected at the end of the period after all actions are observed.
The period payo® of¯rm i consists of the pro¯t realization and the pro¯tability shock realization.
We can write period payo®s as a real valued function de¯ned on A £ S £ < K and given by:
where 1 a equals one if event a occurs and zero otherwise; the pro¯t ¼ depends on the action pro¯le of¯rms and the state vector. We assume that pro¯ts are bounded, j¼ i (:) j < 1 for all i. We sometimes use the symbol ¦ i to denote the (m a ¢ m s ) £ 1 dimensional period pro¯t vector de¯ned
i . The pro¯tability shock a®ects actions k > 0 only. The assumption that action 0 is not a®ected by the pro¯tability shock is not restrictive as only the payo® di®erence between alternative actions matters.
Firms discount future payo®s with the common discount factor¯< 1. The game payo® of¯rm i equals the sum of discounted period payo®s.
Following Tirole (1994, 2001 ), we consider sequential equilibria in Markovian strategies a i (" t i ; s t ). A strategy for¯rm i is a function of the¯rm speci¯c pro¯tability shock and the state variables. The assumption that the pro¯tability shock is independently distributed allows us to write the probability of observing action pro¯le a t as Pr(a
Markovian assumption allows us to abstract from calendar time and subsequently we omit the time superscript.
Symmetry: We are sometimes interested in symmetric payo®s and strategies. Symmetry requires identical payo® vectors, ¦ i = ¦ for all i; and identical strategies for all i. Asymmetries between¯rms are then captured in the state variables only. The symmetry assumption reduces the dimensionality of the problem, which can simplify calculations.
The discounted sum of future payo®s for¯rm i consists of two elements: The period pro¯t and the pro¯tability shock. In value function notation, the discounted sum is given by:
where Pr(a ¡i js) denotes the conditional probability that¯rms ¡i choose an action pro¯le a ¡i conditional on state s, and E " denotes the expectation operator with respect to the¯rm speci¯c productivity shock. The¯niteness of the action and the state spaces guarantees the existence of the value function W i , see Rust (1994) .
Ex ante value function:
We use the ex-ante value function, which is de¯ned as the value function in expression (1) before¯rm-speci¯c shocks are observed and actions are taken,
Taking the expectation with respect to " inside the sum yields:
Equation (2) is satis¯ed at every state vector s 2 S. Since the state space is¯nite, we can express it as a matrix equation:
where P is the m s £ (m a ¢ m s ) dimensional matrix consisting of choice probability Pr(ajs) in row s column (a; s), and zeros in row s column (a; s 0 ) with 
Equation (3) provides an expression for the ex ante value function. The terms on the right hand side are the discount factor, the choice probability matrix, the state transition matrix, the period return function, and the expected pro¯tability shocks.
Notice, that the value function is a linear function in the period payo®s. The linearity property will help us examine the properties of the equilibrium choices in the next section.
6
This section characterizes properties of the dynamic equilibrium. It studies properties of the equilibrium decision rule, the equilibrium discounted sum of payo®s and the equilibrium choice probabilities. We show that the equilibrium decision rule is characterized by an m s ¢ K equation system.
We conclude the section with remarks on the existence and multiplicity of equilibria.
We begin the analysis with a characterization of the equilibrium decision rule. The following
Proposition states a property of equilibrium strategies:
Proposition 1 In any Markov equilibrium for any s 2 S and for all i 2 N there exists an
All proofs are given in the appendix. Proposition 1 establishes that the equilibrium decision on whether to adopt action k or not is monotone in the pro¯tability shock " k i . The statement in the Proposition is readily illustrated for an action pair (k; 0) for a typical¯rm i. It says that, for any state vector, there exists a type " k that is indi®erent between actions k and 0. The monotonicity property follows from the assumption that the payo® function is additive in the private pro¯tability shock " k . If there exists a point " k such that a¯rm of type " k is indi®erent between actions k and 0, then any type with a smaller pro¯tability shock, " k < " k , will prefer action 0. On the other hand, any type with a higher pro¯tability shock, " k > " k , will prefer action k.
The reason is that the current period payo® for an active¯rm is additive in " k , while the future payo®s and the current period payo® for a¯rm choosing action 0 are una®ected by " k . The point " k exists, since the support of " k is unbounded, while the period return ¦, and the value function are bounded.
Indi®erence equation: The indi®erent type " k i receives the same expected discounted sum of payo®s under action k as under action 0. This leads to the indi®erence equation:
Equation (5) is a necessary equilibrium condition that must be satis¯ed at every state s 2 S and for every action k = 1; : : : ; K yielding a total of m s ¢ K equations with m s ¢ K indi®erent types, one for each possible state and action. We may compactly write equation (5) in matrix form. Let We can re-state equation (5) as:
Substituting equation (3) into equation (6), leads us to the following result:
Proposition 2 In any Markov equilibrium for all i 2 N there exists " i such that:
Conversely, any " = (" 1 ; : : : ; " N ) that satis¯es equation (7) can be extended to a Markov equilibrium.
The above Proposition characterizes the set of equilibria. It provides a necessary and su±-cient condition for any Markov equilibrium. It gives a system of m s ¢ K ¢ N indi®erence equations characterizing the m s ¢ K ¢ N equilibrium indi®erence points ". The necessity part stems from the indi®erence condition which says that, for the indi®erent type, the continuation value when taking action k is exactly equal to the continuation value when taking action 0. The su±ciency part in the Proposition is established by showing that any " that satis¯es equation (7) can be extended to construct a decision rule that constitutes a Markov equilibrium.
Equation (7) in Proposition 2 is a linear equation in the parameter ¦ i . The linearity property will play a central role in the identi¯cation and estimation section.
Next, we provide a few remarks on the existence, computation and multiplicity of equilibria. The following theorem establishes that an equilibrium exists.
Theorem 1 A Markov equilibrium exists.
The theorem follows from Brouwer's¯xed point theorem. Equation (7) . The pro¯tability shock is drawn from a standard normal distribution function. Firms decide whether to be active or inactive. Then, there exist multiple equilibria. We describe three symmetric equilibria. Two equilibria have the following feature along the equilibrium path: Only one¯rm is active in any period with high probability. This arises due to the positive monopoly and negative duopoly payo®s. In the¯rst equilibrium the identity of the active¯rm changes every period.
The active¯rm becomes inactive and the inactive¯rm becomes active. In the second equilibrium, the active¯rm remains active and the inactive¯rm remains inactive. The third equilibrium di®ers. On its path, each¯rm has a¯fty percent chance of being active. 1 The equilibria are robust to parameter perturbations. Pro¯t values with distinct values for di®erent states -but small di®erences in the state dimension -and a positive but small discount factor yield equilibria with the same qualitative equilibrium behavior.
Symmetry:
We conclude the section with a discussion of the symmetry assumption which is assumed in the empirical section. Symmetry requires identical payo® vectors ¦ i = ¦ and identical decision rules. It can be veri¯ed that the above arguments remain valid under the symmetry restriction which leads us to the following Corollary:
(i) A symmetric Markov equilibrium exists.
(ii) For any symmetric Markov equilibrium there exists an " 1 such that " = (" 1 ; : : : ; " 1 ) satis¯es
Conversely, any " = (" 1 ; : : : ; " 1 ) that satis¯es equation (8) can be extended to a symmetric Markov equilibrium.
The symmetry assumption reduces the number of equations in (7) . The reduction in dimension reduces the complexity of the problem which may facilitate the numerical calculation of equilibria.
Additionally, symmetry places a number of restrictions on the payo® vector ¦ which can be useful in the empirical analysis.
So far we have characterized several qualitative features of the equilibrium. In addition, we provided a simple characterization of the equilibrium choice probabilities in form of an equation system that can be solved numerically. Finally, we illustrated that the analysis remains valid under the symmetry restriction. Next, we use the necessary and su±cient equilibrium condition (7) which is a linear equation in period payo®s to address the question of identi¯cation.
Identi¯cation
This section studies identi¯cation conditions of the underlying model parameters which are the distribution of pro¯tability shocks F , the discount factor¯, and the period pro¯t vector ¦. We provide conditions that allow us to¯nd a unique set of parameters that rationalizes the observed choices. We conclude the section with a discussion of the identifying conditions in symmetric entry models. These conditions are imposed in our empirical application.
We assume that a time-series sample of choices and states is available. The sample is su±ciently large to characterize the equilibrium choice probabilities.
Assumption 1:
We observe data (a t ; s t ) T t=1 which permit us to characterize the choice probabilities Pr (ajs) and the transition probabilities g(a; s; s 0 ) for any s; s 0 2 S; a 2 A.
Notice that we consider a time-series data set from one industry at a time. Hence, the choice probabilities characterize a single equilibrium.
2
The potential number of¯rms may not be known in some applications. This may arise if¯rms are not observed when inactive. Yet, if there is at least one action in which the¯rm is observed, 2 Identi¯cation of static entry models based on a cross-section data set is considered in Tamer (2003) .
then the potential number of¯rms is identi¯ed. To see this, notice that every period every¯rm has a positive probability of selecting any action. This probability is bounded away from zero. Thus, eventually, all potential¯rms are observed. The potential number of¯rms equals the maximum number of observed¯rms. The Lemma is due to Hotz and Miller (1993) .
The vector of indi®erent types
Lemma 1 Suppose F is known. Suppose there exists a ± > 0 such that Pr(a i = kjs) > ± for all
Then for all i 2 N, s 2 S there exists a unique vector " i (s) that solves the following K equations, one for every action k = 1; : : : ; K, given by:
The Lemma states that the indi®erent types can be uniquely recovered from the choice probabilities provided F is known. The Lemma is easily illustrated for binary action spaces. With binary actions equation (9)can be re-written to obtain a unique and explicit expression for the indi®erent type given by:
With the indi®erent types recovered, we can infer the vector of ex ante expected pro¯tability shocks by using Proposition 1, as:
With the choice probabilities, the transition probabilities and indi®erent types at hand, all the coefcients entering equation (7) are known. Since equation (7) is a necessary and su±cient equilibrium condition, it can be used to infer period payo®s. Next, we discuss in some detail what conditions are required to make this inference possible.
The following Proposition provides a negative identi¯cation result.
Proposition 3 (i) The parameters (F;¯; ¦ 1 ; : : : ; ¦ N ) are not identi¯ed.
(ii) For given F , the parameters (¯; ¦ 1 ; : : : ; ¦ N ) are not identi¯ed.
(iii) For given (F;¯), the parameters (¦ 1 ; : : : ; ¦ N ) are not identi¯ed.
The Proposition says that the model is not identi¯ed. The non-identi¯cation result is similar in spirit to results obtained in the single agent dynamics literature, see Rust (1994) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002) . Part (i) says that in the absence of the knowledge of the distribution function F , the vector " is not determined. Hence, none of the elements in equation (7) are known and the model is clearly not identi¯ed. The non-identi¯cation of the distribution function F is closely related to the assumption of a¯nite action space. When the action space is an interval and the pro¯t function is known, then F can be identi¯ed, as is shown in Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) . A parametric assumption on the distribution function F is not enough, as can be seen from equation (7). Assuming that pro¯tability shocks are normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation ¾ amounts to re-scaling the matrix ¦ by the standard deviation ¾. Hence, the standard deviation ¾ is not identi¯ed.
Parts (ii) and (iii) take the distribution function F as given. They show that the model's remaining parameters are not identi¯ed. The reason is that equation (7) has K ¢ L N ¢ N equations while the parameter vector has (K + 1) N ¢ L N ¢ N + 1 elements. Hence, even if in addition to F the parameter¯is¯xed, the remaining parameters are not identi¯ed.
Proposition 3 establishes the need to impose identifying restrictions. We proceed by¯xing the distribution function F and the discount parameter¯and discussing the identifying restrictions on the pro¯t vector. In our application, we assume F is the standard normal distribution function.
Recall that equation (7) is linear in the pro¯t parameter vector ¦ i . With a known distribution function F and a given discount parameter¯, the question of identi¯cation of ¦ i is then reduced to the question of the existence of a unique solution to the linear equation system. In economic applications it can be veri¯ed whether the restrictions of the model yield a unique solution. We next discuss some restrictions for the single agent and multi agent case that guarantee identi¯cation.
In the single agent case, for a¯xed discount parameter¯, the rank of the matrix premultiplying the pro¯t parameter vector in equation (7) is at most K ¢ L as there are K ¢ L equations. At least L restrictions on pro¯ts are required as the pro¯t parameter vector has (K + 1) ¢ L parameters. In economic applications it is assumed that the pro¯t value for one action, say action zero, is¯xed exogenously for every state, see Magnac and Thesmar (2002) .
In the multi agent case, for a¯xed discount parameter¯and for every¯rm i, the rank of the matrix premultiplying the pro¯t parameter vector ¦ i in equation (7) is at most
N restrictions on pro¯ts are required for every¯rm. We next state two restrictions for the multi agent case. We impose these restrictions in the estimation.
Restriction (R1 ) says that period pro¯ts do not depend on the state variables of other¯rms:
is satis¯ed in games with adjustment costs such as entry or investment games.
Restriction (R2 ) says that period pro¯ts under action a i = 0 are¯xed exogenously for every state s i and action pro¯le a ¡i :
pro¯t parameters. Restriction (R2) is satis¯ed in games in which one action, say action inactivity, implies zero pro¯ts.
Restrictions (R1) and (R2) can be imposed in equation (7). Let X i denote the restricted matrix
which is obtained by summing columns in the unrestricted (7) which are associated with identical pro¯t
Using this notation, the restricted equation (7) can be stated as:
where , (ii) If L¸K + 1, and if the restricted matrix X i has full column rank, then the parameter vector
The Proposition states that the identi¯cation of the pro¯t parameters depends on the dimensionality of the state and action spaces. Part (i) says that if there are fewer states than actions, then the model is not identi¯ed. Part (ii) says that provided the number of states equals at least the number of actions, and the restricted matrix X i has full column rank, then the pro¯t parameters are identi¯ed.
Observe that restriction (R2) in Proposition 4 is required. The intuitive reasons is that the indi®erence analysis determines payo®s relative to the payo® under action a i = 0 at every state only. The formal reasons is that the matrix X i consists of a product of matrices,
imensional matrix P i given by: The¯rst column in the matrix P i , which is associated with action a i = 0, is collinear with the remaining columns in the matrix P i requiring that payo®s associated with one action for every state are exogenously¯xed.
Part (ii) in Proposition 4 requires that the matrix X i has full column rank
This condition is required as the rank condition may fail. Recall our earlier example illustrating the multiplicity of equilibria. In the¯rst two equilibria the rank of the matrix X i equals 4 while in the third equilibrium the rank equals 2 only.
Next, we brie°y discuss symmetric games with binary actions (and states). We describe the assumptions and the set of identifying restrictions in this case in more detail, as we will take this speci¯cation to our data.
Identi¯cation in Symmetric Entry Games
This section describes a set of identifying assumptions for symmetric entry models. We impose these assumptions in the empirical analysis.
The action space of¯rm i is binary, K = 1. Action 1 denotes a¯rm that remains active, or enters the market. Action 0 represents an exiting¯rm, or a¯rm that remains inactive.
The state space of¯rm i consists of two elements: A binary variable s i that indicates whether rm i was active in the preceding period, s i = 2, or inactive, s i = 1, and a demand variable s 0
Symmetry implies that the number of other active¯rms is a su±cient statistic for the vector of other¯rms' actions a ¡i . We denote the number of other active¯rms by ±. It ranges from 0 to N ¡ 1. Similarly, the number of other¯rms with an active state is a su±cient statistic for s ¡i . We denote the number of other¯rms with an active state by µ. The dimensionality of the binary state space under symmetry equals m s = 2 ¢ N ¢ L d . Similarly, the dimensionality of the binary action space reduces to m a = 2 ¢ N. Period pro¯ts can be written as ¼ (a i ; ±; s i ; µ; s 0 ).
Restriction (R1) can be imposed in the symmetric entry model by omitting the dependence on µ in the pro¯t vector. To satisfy restriction (R2), we¯x the exit value of an active¯rm at 10, b(a ¡i ; 1) = 10; and assume zero pro¯ts for inactive¯rms that are inactive in the preceding period, b(a ¡i ; 0) = 0. We assume an annual discount factor¯= 0:9 and assume F is the standard normal distribution function. By Proposition 4, if the associated restricted matrix
then the restricted pro¯t vector ¦ is identi¯ed. In our application the rank condition is satis¯ed and the restricted pro¯t parameters are indeed identi¯ed.
So far, we have described properties of the dynamic equilibrium and established conditions that permit identi¯cation of the parameters of the model. We illustrated the identi¯cation conditions for symmetric entry games in more detail. The next section addresses how to estimate the parameters.
Estimation Approach
This section proposes our estimator. Our estimation strategy follows the steps in the identi¯cation argument. First, we estimate the choice probabilities. Second, we infer the period pro¯t parameters by using the linear equation (10) . We characterize the properties of the estimator. We conclude the section with a discussion of the estimator for symmetric entry games and the restrictions imposed on the estimator by our data.
The potential number of¯rms may not be observed. By assumption, the probability that all potential¯rms are observed (are active) in a given period is positive and bounded away from zero.
An estimator b N for the potential number of¯rms is then the maximum number of¯rms observed in any period, b N = max t N t . It can be veri¯ed that the estimator b N is consistent and supere±cient, as it converges a rate faster than p T . The fast rate of convergence of b N implies that the asymptotic properties of the choice probabilities estimator and pro¯t parameters estimator will not be a®ected by b N. We can proceed as if N is known.
The choices and states are multinomially distributed. This follows from the assumption that the set of feasible actions and states is¯nite. Let p(k; i; s) denote the probability that¯rm i selects action k in state s. De¯ne the observed choice frequency by n kis = P t 1 fa t i =k;s t =sg for all i 2 N;k 2 A i ; s 2 S and observed state frequency by n ass 0 = P t 1 fa t =a;s t =s;s t+1 =s 0 g . We may write the log likelihood of the multinomial model as:
n ass 0 log g(a; s; s 0 ) where P k2Ai p(k; i; s) = 1 for all i 2 N;s 2 S and P s 0 2S g(a; s; s 0 ) = 1 for all a 2 A;s 2 S. We assume that the vector of state variables at time t = 0, s 0 , is exogenous. An examination of the¯rst order conditions yields that the maximum likelihood estimator equals the sample frequency:
Moreover, the solution to the¯rst order condition is unique. 
Moroever, Lemma 8.14 in Van Der Vaart (1998) implies that the estimator Ã( b µ T ) is asymptotically e±cient.
The estimator is computationally very simple. Before proceeding with the application, we discuss the restrictions that our data impose on the estimator in more detail.
Estimation of Symmetric Entry Games
We assume a deterministic state transition rule and do not estimate g. The assumption is satis¯ed if agents have perfect foresight concerning the evolution of the exogenous demand process measured by the gross domestic product. Actions are binary, K = 1, yielding a binomial choice model.
We do not observe actions for a number of states because these states did not occur in our sample period. These data limitations lead us to adopt a parametric framework for the choice probabilities.
We parameterize the choice probability in the following way:
where © denotes the standard normal distribution and ® ¢ s denotes a linear function of the state variables. The linear function is given by:
where 1 fs t i =2g denotes an indicator function that equals one if¯rm i is active in the preceding period and zero otherwise, ± t = P j 6 =i 1 fs t j =2g denotes the Number of Other Active Firms, and s t 0 denotes the log gross domestic product.
Pro¯t Value Estimates:
With the estimator b ® in hand, we infer ", calculate the probability matrices P i ; P; G and the vector D i . We assume an annual discount factor¯= 0:9. All the coe±cients in the linear equation (10) are available and we infer the restricted period pro¯t parameters. As explained above, the standard errors for the period pro¯t parameters are calculated using the delta method.
The next section introduces our data for pubs, restaurants, co®eehouses, carpenters, and bakeries for two Lower Austrian cities.
Data
This section introduces our data set and gives descriptive statistics.
We have collected quarterly time series information on the identity of active pubs, restaurants, Baden has about 24; 000 inhabitants. Amstetten is of similar size with a population of about 23; 000.
We supplemented the information with quarterly gross domestic product information for Austria.
( Table I about In summary, the data provide us with time series information on the identity of active pubs, restaurants, co®eehouses, carpenters and bakeries in two selected Austrian towns, Baden and Amstetten, over a time period of more than 20 years. There is persistence in the active spell of businesses.
Bakeries and carpenters remain open for about ten years while pubs, co®eehouses and restaurants remain open for about 5 to 6 years. There is considerable turnover in these professions. In Baden a new pub is opened on average every half year, and a pub is closed at the same rate. Similarly a restaurant and co®eehouse opens every half year. For bakeries there is less turnover. In Baden a new bakery opens every 2 to 3 years and a bakery closes with the same frequency.
Estimation Results
This section reports our estimates. We begin with a description of the choice probability estimates.
Then, we assess the goodness of¯t of the empirical model by sampling from the distribution of choice probability estimates and comparing the resulting distribution of pseudo samples to the observed data. Finally, we describe the period pro¯t parameter estimates.
Table II reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the probability of being active. We assume symmetric behavior and pool the decisions of all¯rms within a profession and city. The total number of¯rms ranges between 11 and 29 across professions and cities. The number is tabulated in Table   I . Explanatory variables include Lagged Active which is a dummy variable that equals one if thē rm was active in the preceding period, the Number of Other Active Firms equals the number of other¯rms that were active in the preceding period, an interaction term between Lagged Active and the Number of Other Active Firms, and Log GDP which measures the logarithm of the Austrian gross domestic product. In all speci¯cations, we can reject the null that the coe±cients are jointly insigni¯cant. (Table II about here) We interpret the estimates in Table II by evaluating the probability of being active at the sample mean of Log GDP and the sample median of the Number of Other Active Firms: For all professions in both cities, Lagged Active has a signi¯cant positive e®ect on the decision to be active. For pubs in Baden, Lagged Active increases the probability of being active in the next period by 84%. In other professions the number ranges between 83% and 94%. The evidence in Amstetten is somewhat stronger. Lagged Active increases the probability of being active in the next period by 90% for pubs.
In other professions the number ranges between 89% and 96%.
Number of Other Active Firms has a signi¯cant e®ect in three professions in Baden and in all professions in Amstetten. In both cities and all professions, increasing the Number of Other Active
Firms by one has a negative e®ect on being active. The magnitude of the e®ect of increasing the Number of Other Active Firms by one is small, ranging between ¡0:2% and ¡1:3% in Baden. In Amstetten the e®ect ranges between ¡0:4% and ¡1:1%.
Log GDP has a positive e®ect in two of¯ve professions in Baden. Increasing Log GDP by 1% increases the probability of being active by 5:8% for restaurants, by 8:2% for carpenters. For pubs, co®eehouses and bakeries the e®ect di®ers. There a 1% increase in Log GDP lowers the probability of being active by 6:9%, 3:1% and 1:9%, respectively. In Amstetten, Log GDP has a positive e®ect on being active in all professions. The Log GDP e®ect ranges between 0:1% and 7:6%.
Higher order terms for the Number of Other Active Firms can be included in the speci¯cation of the choice probabilities. It turns out that higher order terms are not signi¯cant for most professions.
We conducted likelihood ratio tests of the null hypothesis that the coe±cients of second order terms for Number of Other Active Firms are equal to zero. In Baden, the null cannot be rejected at the ten percent level in four of¯ve professions. In Amstetten, the null cannot be rejected at the ten percent level in three of¯ve professions. The exceptions are restaurants in Baden, and pubs and co®eehouses in Amstetten.
Symmetry is imposed in the speci¯cation of Table II . With a su±ciently rich data set, asymmetry could be accounted for in the estimation. Asymmetry, which is sometimes referred to as unobserved heterogeneity in the empirical literature, can be accounted for in the estimation. For example, choice probabilities can be estimated for each¯rm individually by using a full set of state variables as explanatory variables. The coe±cients would then account for possible asymmetric e®ects of opponents' state variables. Unfortunately, the number of parameters for a full asymmetric model exceeds what is feasible for the limited information available in our data. None the less, we consider a simpli¯ed speci¯cation that permits some asymmetries between¯rms.
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity is tested in the following way: We re-estimate the probit model by including a set of¯rm speci¯c dummy variables, in addition to the variables listed in Table II . We conduct two tests: First, we test the null hypothesis of jointly not signi¯cant e®ects of the dummy variables. The test statistic is distributed as a chi-squared random variable. Wē nd that at the one percent level the null of no signi¯cant e®ects cannot be rejected in four of¯ve professions in Baden and in all professions in Amstetten. At the¯ve and ten percent level, the null cannot be rejected in three of¯ve professions in Baden and in two of¯ve professions in Amstetten.
Our second test considers the null hypothesis that the coe±cients for the four explanatory variables in Table II are equal between two speci¯cations: with and without¯rm dummies. The Wald test statistic is distributed as a chi-squared random variable with four degrees of freedom. We¯nd that the null cannot be rejected for all professions in Baden and Amstetten at the ten percent level. We can conclude that asymmetries do not appear an important concern in our data.
As a measure of goodness of¯t of the choice probability estimates in Table II we conduct the following experiment. We draw a random sample from the distribution of choice parameter estimates.
with the choice parameter estimates. We repeat the exercise 100 times and compare the simulated paths to the observed path. Summary statistics for the observed path are given in Table I . Both, in Baden and Amstetten, the simulated average number of¯rms is somewhat lower than the observed number for all professions but the di®erence is small in magnitude. We cannot reject the null of no di®erences for all¯ve professions in both cities. Comparing the number of entrants, exits and activity spells between the simulated and observed data reveals the following: In both, Baden and Amstetten, there are no signi¯cant di®erences between the observed and the simulated number of entrants, exits and activity spells in all¯ve professions. The choice probability estimates explain turnovers accurately. Tables III and IV, respectively. As described above, we¯x the annual discount parameter¯at 0:9, assume that F is the standard normal distribution function, assume zero pro¯t for inactive¯rms that remain inactive, and¯x the exit value at 10. We assume a deterministic transition rule for GDP. For out of sample future time periods, we assume that the GDP level is constant and equal to the GDP value achieved in 2002. Under these assumptions, for all¯ve professions in both cities, the restricted matrix X appearing in equation (10) We report entry cost estimates at the low GDP level only, as there is a negligibly small e®ect of GDP on entry costs. (Table III about here)
Estimates of period pro¯t parameters in Baden and Amstetten are reported in
The interpretation of the coe±cient estimates in Table III is The e®ect of GDP on period pro¯ts is positive but small in magnitude on most occasions. Tables III and IV illustrate substantial payo® di®erences between newly entered and already active¯rms consistent with dynamic entry models. The entry cost estimates are of much larger magnitude than the pro¯t estimates implying that it takes a number of periods to recover the entry cost. We constructed a Chi-Squared test of the null hypothesis that the Number of Other Active Firms has no e®ect on pro¯t estimates. We can reject the null of no e®ect in all professions and both cities. An increase in the Number of Other Active Firms decreases the pro¯t estimates in most professions and GDP levels.
The pro¯t parameter estimates in
The estimates in Tables III and IV rely on two identifying assumptions. These assumptions are an annual discount factor¯¯xed at 0:9, and the exit value¯xed at 10. The e®ect of the identifying assumptions on the parameter estimates is readily illustrated. An increase in the discount factor¯, decreases the pro¯t estimates at all state variables. The entry cost estimates remain una®ected by a change in the discount factor as they are de¯ned as the pro¯t di®erence between active and inactive states, ¼ (1; ±; 2; s 0 ) ¡ ¼ (1; ±; 1; s 0 ). An increase in the exit value lowers the entry cost by exactly the same amount. In the extreme scenario in which the exit value is zero, most entry cost estimates in Tables III and IV remain negative and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. An increase in the exit value magni¯es the pro¯t estimates for active¯rms.
With the pro¯t estimates at hand, we can numerically calculate equilibria by using equation (8) . From section 3 we know that the numerical calculation need not yield the equilibrium outcome that is observed because the model can exhibit multiple equilibria. However, in our case, repeated numerical calculations yield choice probabilities almost identical to the choice probability estimates in Table II . A possible reason is that the zeros of equation (8) are locally unique. With starting values that are not too far away from the choice probability estimates in Table II, numerical algorithms tend to converge to the same solution.
In sum, the estimates of choice probabilities¯t the time series data for pubs, restaurants, coffeehouses, carpenters and bakeries in Baden and Amstetten well. Our goodness of¯t test indicates that the model explains the data accurately. The pro¯t parameter estimates con¯rm substantial payo® di®erences between newly entered and already active¯rms consistent with dynamic entry models. Additionally, we can reject the null that the Number of Other Active Firms has no e®ect in all professions con¯rming the importance of strategic e®ects. The e®ect of the Number of Other Active Firms on period pro¯t estimates has the expected sign in most professions. With all the pro¯t estimates at hand, we can illustrate¯rms' decisions and assess policy questions. This is done in the next section.
Value Function Estimates and Entry Tax
This section considers two applications of our estimates. Subsection 8.1. depicts the long run expected discounted sum of payo®s to active and inactive¯rms. Subsection 8.2. conducts the policy experiments in which the regulator imposes a unit tax on¯rms wishing to enter.
Value Function Estimates
This section illustrates our estimates for the discounted sum of¯rms' payo®s for carpenters in Baden.
We select carpenters in Baden to illustrate interesting payo® di®erences between active and inactivē rms. Additionally, we illustrate di®erences between short and long run payo®s. Estimates for other professions yield qualitatively similar results. The discounted sum of payo®s is calculated from the period pro¯t estimates by using the formula given in equation (3) Comparing the long run value function estimates with the short run pro¯t estimates in Table   III reveals that GDP and the Number of Other Active Firms have a stronger e®ect in the short run than in the long run.
Entry Tax
This section reports a policy experiment of a tax on entry. We select carpenters in Baden and assess the e®ect of the tax on the equilibrium outcome.
The experiment is as follows: We draw a random sample from the distribution of pro¯t estimates for carpenters described in Table III . We increase the entry cost estimate by one unit at all state variables. We then numerically calculate the new equilibrium based on the modi¯ed period payo®s by using equation (8) . The equilibrium choice probabilities are then used to simulate one path of rms' choices by randomly drawing from the distribution associated with the equilibrium choice parameters. We repeat the exercise 60 times and compare the simulated after tax equilibrium paths to the observed path. Summary statistics for the observed path are given in Table I. Somewhat surprisingly, the tax does not a®ect the distribution of the number of active¯rms signi¯cantly. The after tax simulated average number of active¯rms equals 11:14 with a standard deviation of 0:64. The number is not signi¯cantly di®erent from the mean number of active¯rms in Table I The reduction in turnovers as a result of the tax can be explained by using the indi®erent type analysis described in section 3. The range of pro¯tability shocks in which an inactive¯rm decides to enter is reduced as a larger pro¯tability shock is required to o®set the increased entry cost. On the other hand, the range of pro¯tability shocks in which an active¯rm decides to remain active is increased as the continuation value when exiting is reduced due to the tax. Hence, the ex ante expected pro¯tability shock when active is reduced.
An examination of the average value functions across simulations reveals the following: The expected discounted sum of payo®s for an inactive¯rm is substantially reduced due to the tax. The reduction is signi¯cant. The value function of an inactive¯rm, evaluated at the high or low GDP level which is depicted in Figures 1 and 3 , falls by 56% to 63% across the range of the Number of Other Active Firms. The decrease in value ranges between 1:05 and 1:10 in absolute value at the high GDP level and between 0:57 and 0:59 in absolute value at the low GDP level.
For most of the range of state variables, active¯rms take a small percentage fall in expected discounted sum of payo®s. The change ranges between ¡7% and +2% across the range of all state variables, but is not signi¯cant at any point. The change in absolute value at the high GDP level ranges between ¡0:21 and ¡0:97. The change in absolute value at the low GDP level ranges between ¡0:48 and +0:25.
We calculate the tax e®ect on all¯rms as the di®erence in the sum of pre and post value functions of all¯rms combined. The net tax e®ect on¯rms is negative. The total loss ranges between -2.92 and -8.77 across the range of the number of active¯rms. Some of the¯rms' losses will be o®set by the revenues generated by the tax. We¯nd that the expected sum of discounted tax revenues ranges between +2.37 and +7.55 over the range of the number of active¯rms. Adding the net tax e®ect on¯rms and the tax revenues implies a total tax e®ect ranging between -4.78 and +0.45 over the range of the number of¯rms. As the number of active¯rms increases, the total e®ect increases initially, peaking between 6 and 7¯rms, and then decreases. The total tax e®ect is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero for any number of¯rms.
Increasing the tax to three units yields results qualitatively similar to the unit tax case: The distribution of the number of active¯rms remains not signi¯cantly di®erent from the before tax distribution. The number of turnovers and the expected discounted sum of payo®s for an inactivē rm are reduced due to the tax and more so than with a unit tax. The average value function of an active¯rm becomes steeper with the three-unit tax. It is higher with a small Number of Other Active Firms and lower with a large Number of Other Active Firms relative to the before tax value function. The di®erence is marginally signi¯cant at some values of the Number of Other Active Firms. The total tax e®ect, calculated as the sum of the net tax e®ect on¯rms plus the tax revenues, is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero for most of the range of the number of¯rms. It is marginally signi¯cant positive with seven to nine¯rms and marginally signi¯cant negative with 15 rms.
In sum, the tax does not a®ect the long-run number of active¯rms. Instead, it reduces the frequency of turnovers as it makes entry more costly. The tax adversely a®ects inactive¯rms as the cost of entry is increased. Already active¯rms are not signi¯cantly a®ected by the tax for most of the range of the number of¯rms. Taking the tax revenues into account, the total e®ect on the sum of future discounted payo®s is on occasions positive but not signi¯cant for most of the range of the number of¯rms.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a new estimation method for Markovian games with¯nite actions. The basis of our analysis is a necessary and su±cient equilibrium condition for dynamic games. The equilibrium condition permits us to characterize the identi¯cation conditions of the underlying model parameters.
We propose an estimation method following the steps in the identi¯cation argument. The estimator is e±cient and computationally easy to implement. We apply the proposed estimator to time series data on entry and exit decisions for a number of professions in two Austrian cities. The model¯ts the data well. Dynamic e®ects are important as active¯rms are very likely to remain active in the next period. We calculate the e®ect of an entry tax on the equilibrium outcome. Somewhat surprisingly, the distribution of active¯rms does not change signi¯cantly as a result of the tax but the number of turnovers is reduced signi¯cantly. While the characterization of the identi¯cation conditions is reasonably complete, the estimator is computationally simple, and policy experiments can be conducted, there are at least two shortcomings in our analysis:
First, not all the primitives of the model are identi¯able as the discount factor and the distribution of unobserved pro¯tability shocks are not identi¯ed. It may be possible to alleviate the non-identi¯cation concern by adopting a formulation that omits the pro¯tability shock. In the absence of a pro¯tability shock,¯rms will not necessarily adopt pure strategies. Instead,¯rms may randomize between alternative actions. The resulting mixed strategy equilibrium will generate endogenously a distribution over di®erent outcomes which may form the basis for an alternative estimation approach.
Second, the assumption of Markovian strategies is restrictive as it does not permit full history dependent behavior. An increase in the state space would permit strategies to be richer functions of past actions. However, full history dependent behavior, which plays a prominent role in the development of the theory of strategic dynamic games, cannot be captured.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a typical¯rm i deciding between action k and action 0 at any state s. By assumption, the payo® function is linear in the private pro¯tability shock " k . If there exists a point " k such that a¯rm of type " k is indi®erent between actions k and 0, then any type with a smaller pro¯tability shock, " k < " k , will prefer action 0 to action k. On the other hand, any type with a higher pro¯tability shock, " k > " k , will prefer action k to action 0. The reason is that the pro¯tability shock " k a®ects the current period payo® under action k only. Future payo®s and current period payo®s under action k 0 6 = k are una®ected by " k .
Next, consider a type (" k ; " k 0 ) for any k; k 0 6 = 0. By transitivity, if the type is indi®erent between actions k and 0, and indi®erent between actions 0 and k 0 , then the type is also indi®erent between action k and k 0 . Furthermore, transitivity implies that if
prefers action k to actions k 0 and 0, while if
to actions k and 0.
Finally, we need to show that the indi®erent points " = (" 1 ; : : : ; " K ) exist. The indi®erent " k type receives the same expected discounted sum of payo®s under action k as under action 0, which leads to the indi®erence equation:
By assumption, the period return ¦ i and the ex ante expected pro¯tability shock are bounded. The discount factor¯is less than 1 and, hence, the value function is bounded. In turn this implies that the¯rst expression on the left hand side and the expression on the right hand side in equation (12) are bounded. Hence, the indi®erent point " k , which equals the di®erence between those two expressions, is contained in a bounded interval, and there exists a¯nite positive number E such that
. Hence, the indi®erent points " = (" 1 ; : : : ; " K ) must exist, since, by assumption, the support of " k is unbounded. This establishes the result.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, we show that equation (7) must be satis¯ed in any equilibrium.
It is an immediate consequence from Proposition 1, that for every i the indi®erent " k i type receives the same expected discounted sum of payo®s under action k as under action 0, which leads to the indi®erence equation:
Equation (13) is a necessary equilibrium condition that must be satis¯ed at every state s 2 S and for every action k = 1; : : : ; K yielding a total of m s ¢ K equations with m s ¢ k indi®erent types, one for each possible state and action. We may compactly write equation (13) in matrix form. We can re-state equation (13) as:
Next, we substitute equation (3) into equation (14) to obtain an equation that characterizes the equilibrium indi®erence points " i . To do so, notice that the vector of ex ante expected pro¯tability shocks can be restated using the indi®erence points:
which leads us to the characterization stated in the Proposition. This establishes the¯rst part.
Next, we take for every¯rm i a vector " i that satis¯es equation (7). We need to construct a Markovian strategy, beliefs and a continuation value and show that they constitute an equilibrium.
For a given " i , we de¯ne the Markovian strategy as in Proposition 1, as:
The above decision rule yields beliefs which we denote with the choice probability matrix P ("). The decision rule also implies expected pro¯tability shocks which we denote as D i ("). As in equation (3), the value function is then given by:
By construction, the decision rule is optimal for the above continuation value and beliefs. Further, the beliefs are consistent. This establishes the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 1. We need to show that equation (7) has a solution. We can re-write the equation to de¯ne the function h = (h 1 ; : : : ; h N ) with component h i given by:
A¯xed point of the function h will be a zero of equation (7). By assumption, the expected period payo® is bounded and, hence, the ex ante value function is bounded. As is shown in the proof of The elements entering the function h are continuous, as the decision rule, characterized in Proposition 1, and the resulting choice probability matrix are continuous in ". Brouwer's¯xed point theorem implies that there exists a¯xed point " of the function h. By Proposition 2, the¯xed point corresponds to an equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 1. The arguments in the proofs of Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 do not rely on asymmetry. The same arguments remain valid with the symmetry assumption in place.
Proof of Lemma 1. Pick any state s 2 S and¯rm i 2 N . Denote with Á k (") the probability that action k is chosen. Elementary calculus shows that the probability equals:
denote the observed probability that¯rm i selects action k, and de¯ne the function Ã :
A zero of the function Ã corresponds to a solution in equation (9) . By assumption, the function F is di®erentiable and, hence, Á is di®erentiable.
Taking the derivative shows that Á satis¯es the gross substitute property:
Let DÃ denote the gradient of Ã. Since, by construction, P K l=0 Á l (") = 1, and
We show that there exists a " such that Ã l (") < 0 for all l¸1. By assumption the probability P k is bounded away from zero, P k¸± > 0 for all k. Pick " 1 = F ¡1 (1 ¡ ±) + 1. Consider the following inequalities:
The¯rst inequality uses that F (" k ) K¡1 · 1. The second inequality uses that by construction,
Since P l¸± , it follows that Ã l (" 1 ; : : : ; " 1 ) < 0 for all l¸1.
Next, we show that there exists a " such that Ã l (") > 0 for all l¸1. Clearly, there exists a "
To see this,¯x " k = " 1 for all k 0¸1 and observe that by construction:
Since P K l=1 P l = 1 ¡ P 0 with P 0 bounded away from zero, we can pick " 1 su±ciently low, and have P K l=1 Ã l (") > 0. Now, by the implicit function theorem and the gross substitute property, we can
approaches zero, there must exist a " such that Ã l (") > 0 for all l¸1.
Since there exist "; " such that Ã l (") > 0, Ã l (") < 0 for all l¸1, by continuity of Ã there exists a " such that Ã l (") = 0 for all l¸1.
It remains to show that the zero is unique. Suppose there are two zeros. That is there are "; " 
Clearly, the number of parameters exceeds the number of equations, and elementary properties of linear equations establish that the parameter vector ¦ i is not identi¯ed.
Parts (i) and (ii) follow immediately from part (iii).
Proof of Proposition 4. By de¯nition, the matrix
Imposing restrictions (R1) and (R2) together yields the restricted matrix
by summing columns in the unrestricted matrix X i which are associated with identical pro¯t values.
The restricted pro¯t parameter vector ¦ i has dimension
By elementary properties of linear equations, the parameter vector ¦ i is identi¯ed provided the matrix X i has full column rank. Full column rank is achieved if the rank equals
L. Now, the number of rows in X i equals K ¢ L N , while the number of columns in X i equals 
